

Boneh-Franklin Identity Based Encryption Revisited

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Abstract. The first practical identity based encryption (IBE) scheme was proposed by Boneh and Franklin in [BF03]. In this work we point out that there is a flawed step in the security reduction exhibited by the authors. Fortunately, it is possible to fix it without changing the scheme or the underlying assumption.

In the second place, we introduce a variant of the seminal IBE scheme which allows a more efficient security reduction. The new scheme is simpler, and has more compact ciphertexts than Boneh-Franklin's proposal, while keeping the computational cost.

Finally, we observe that the flawed step pointed out here is present in several works, and that our techniques can be applied to obtain tighter reductions for previous relevant schemes.

Keywords: provable security, identity-based encryption, exact security, bilinear maps.

1 Introduction

The concept of Identity Based Encryption (IBE) was proposed by Shamir in [Sha85], aimed at simplifying certificate management in e-mail related systems. The idea is that an arbitrary string such as an e-mail address or a telephone number could serve as a public key for an encryption scheme. Once a user U receives a communication encrypted using its identity ID_U , the user authenticates itself to a Private Key Generation Center (KGC) from which it obtains the corresponding private key d_{ID_U} .

The problem was not satisfactorily solved until the work by Boneh and Franklin [BF03]. They proposed formal security notions for IBE systems and designed a fully functional secure IBE scheme using bilinear maps. The security is based on a variant of the Computational Diffie-Hellman assumption, called Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption. This scheme and the tools developed in its design have been successfully applied in numerous cryptographic settings, transcending by far the identity based cryptography framework.

On the other hand, an important concern when exhibiting a security reductionist proof is that of the efficiency of the reduction. One of the goals pursued

is to preserve as much as possible the strength of the underlying hard problem which is used in the protocol's design. An inefficient security reduction would imply the use of larger key sizes to attain a given security level.

Our contributions. In the first place, we show there is a flawed step in the security reduction exhibited in [BF03] for the scheme proposed for chosen ciphertext security. Fortunately, the reduction can be changed without modifying the original scheme or the underlying hard problem used to state the security. The efficiency of the new security reduction is a bit worse than the previous one. This is just another example in which a well-known and widely used construction turns out to have an unnoticed flawed security reduction.

In the second place, we modify the scheme by Boneh and Franklin towards obtaining a more efficient security reduction. Indeed, it is possible to show a tighter security reduction for a modified scheme which uses one less random oracle. The new proposal also presents more compact ciphertexts than the original scheme.

Finally, since Boneh-Franklin IBE scheme has been used as a building block for numerous protocols, the corrections and improvements we present here are likely to be applied to further schemes. For instance, this is the case for the schemes in [GS02,HL02,Gen03,AP03,YFDL04,CC05].

2 Preliminaries

We begin by fixing some notation. If A is a non-empty set, then $x \leftarrow A$ denotes that x has been uniformly chosen in A . If A is a finite set, then $|A|$ denotes its cardinality.

2.1 Definitions for IBE schemes

Identity based encryption (IBE). An IBE is specified by four probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithms:

Setup takes a security parameter 1^ℓ and returns the system parameters **params** and **master-key**. The system parameters include the description of sets \mathcal{M}, \mathcal{C} , which denote the set of messages and ciphertexts respectively. **params** is publicly available, while the **master-key** is kept secret by the KGC.

Extract takes as inputs **params**, **master-key** and an arbitrary string $ID \in \{0, 1\}^*$ and returns a private key d_{ID} to the user with identity ID . This must be done over a secure channel, since d_{ID} enables to decrypt ciphertexts under the identity ID .

Encrypt takes as inputs **params**, $ID \in \{0, 1\}^*$ and $M \in \mathcal{M}$. It returns a ciphertext $C \in \mathcal{C}$.

Decrypt takes as inputs **params**, $C \in \mathcal{C}$ and a private key d_{ID} , and it returns $M \in \mathcal{M}$ or rejects.

Chosen ciphertext security. An IBE scheme is said to have indistinguishability against an adaptive chosen ciphertext attack (IND-ID-CCA) if any PPT algorithm \mathcal{A} has a negligible advantage in the following game:

Setup The challenger takes a security parameter 1^ℓ and runs the **Setup** algorithm. It gives **params** to the adversary. It keeps the **master-key** to itself.

Phase 1 The adversary issues queries of the form

- Extraction query $\langle \text{ID}_i \rangle$. The challenger runs algorithm **Extract** to generate the private key d_i corresponding to ID_i . It sends d_i to the adversary.
- Decryption query $\langle \text{ID}_i, C_i \rangle$. The challenger generates the private key d_i . It then runs **Decrypt** to decrypt C_i under ID_i .

These queries may be asked adaptively, that is, each query may depend on the answers obtained to the previous queries.

Challenge The adversary outputs equal length plaintexts $M_0, M_1 \in \mathcal{M}$ and an identity ID_{ch} . The only constraint is that the private key for ID_{ch} was not requested in Phase 1. The challenger picks $\beta \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$ and sets $C = \text{Encrypt}(\text{params}, \text{ID}_{\text{ch}}, M_\beta)$. It sends C to the adversary.

Phase 2 The adversary issues extraction and decryption queries as in Phase 1, with the restriction $\langle \text{ID}_i \rangle \neq \langle \text{ID}_{\text{ch}} \rangle$ and $\langle \text{ID}_i, C_i \rangle \neq \langle \text{ID}_{\text{ch}}, C \rangle$.

Guess The adversary outputs a guess $\beta' \in \{0, 1\}$.

Such an adversary is called an IND-ID-CCA adversary \mathcal{A} , and its advantage is defined as $\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{E}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{CCA}}(1^\ell) = |\Pr[\beta = \beta'] - 1/2|$.

Similarly, indistinguishability against passive adversaries (IND-ID-CPA) can also be defined. In this case, the game between the challenger and the adversary is similar to the IND-ID-CCA case, but disallowing decryption queries. The advantage of an adversary in this game is defined as $\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{E}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{CPA}}(1^\ell) = |\Pr[\beta = \beta'] - 1/2|$.

Definition 1. An IBE system \mathcal{E} is secure under chosen ciphertext attacks (*resp.* chosen plaintext attacks) if for any probabilistic polynomial time IND-ID-CCA (*resp.* IND-ID-CPA) adversary \mathcal{A} the function $\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{E}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{CCA}}(1^\ell)$ (*resp.* $\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{E}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{CPA}}(1^\ell)$) is negligible.

2.2 Bilinear maps and bilinear groups

Let $\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2$ and \mathbb{G}_T be finite abelian groups in which the discrete logarithm is believed to be hard. We use additive notation for $\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2$ whereas multiplicative notation is used for \mathbb{G}_T . Thus, $\mathbb{G}_1^* = \mathbb{G}_1 \setminus \{O_1\}$ and $\mathbb{G}_T^* = \mathbb{G}_T \setminus \{1_T\}$, where O_1 and 1_T are the identity elements in \mathbb{G}_1 and \mathbb{G}_T respectively. By a *pairing* or *bilinear map* we will refer to a non-degenerate bilinear function $\hat{e} : \mathbb{G}_1 \times \mathbb{G}_2 \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_T$. In some protocols the existence of a computable isomorphism $\psi : \mathbb{G}_2 \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_1$ is assumed. In particular, this implies that $\psi(aP_2) = a\psi(P_2)$. By a *bilinear group* we refer to a tuple $(\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, \mathbb{G}_T, \hat{e}, \psi)$ with the properties described above.

Bilinear maps are usually implemented using the Weil or modified Tate pairings on an elliptic curve. In general, the elements in \mathbb{G}_1 allow more compact representation than those in \mathbb{G}_2 . In the following it is assumed that $|\mathbb{G}_1| =$

$|\mathbb{G}_2| = |\mathbb{G}_T| = p$, where p is prime; $\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2$ are cyclic groups generated by P_1, P_2 respectively and $\psi(P_2) = P_1$. In this context, the map \hat{e} is non-degenerate if and only if $\hat{e}(P_1, P_2) \neq 1_{\mathbb{G}_T}$. We refer to [BF03] for further details.

Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) Problem on $(\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2)$. Given $aP_2, bP_2 \in \mathbb{G}_2^*$ and $cP_1 \in \mathbb{G}_1^*$, where $P_2 \leftarrow \mathbb{G}_2^*, P_1 = \psi(P_2), a, b, c \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^*$; compute $W = \hat{e}(P_1, P_2)^{abc} \in \mathbb{G}_T$.

We say that an algorithm $\mathcal{B}(t, \varepsilon)$ breaks BDH on $(\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2)$ if it runs in time at most t and has advantage at least ε , that is,

$$\Pr[\mathcal{B}(P_2, aP_2, bP_2, cP_1) = \hat{e}(P_1, P_2)^{abc}] \geq \varepsilon,$$

where the probability is taken over the random choices of the parameters, and the random bits of \mathcal{B} .

Bilinear Decision Diffie-Hellman (BDDH) Problem on $(\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2)$. Let $aP_2, bP_2 \in \mathbb{G}_2^*, cP_1 \in \mathbb{G}_1^*$, and $T \leftarrow \mathbb{G}_T$, where $P_2 \leftarrow \mathbb{G}_2^*, P_1 = \psi(P_2), a, b, c \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^*$. We say that an algorithm $\mathcal{B}(t, \varepsilon)$ breaks BDDH on $(\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2)$ if it runs in time at most t and

$$|\Pr[\mathcal{B}(P_2, aP_2, bP_2, cP_1, \hat{e}(P_1, P_2)^{abc}) = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{B}(P_2, aP_2, bP_2, cP_1, T) = 1]| \geq \varepsilon,$$

where the probability is computed over the random choices of the parameters, and the random bits of \mathcal{B} . Hereafter, the distribution on the left side is called *BDH distribution* and is denoted by \mathcal{P}_{BDH} , while the distribution on the right is called *random BDH distribution* and is denoted by \mathcal{R}_{BDH} .

3 Security proof of Boneh-Franklin identity based encryption scheme revisited

In this section we consider the identity based encryption (IBE) scheme by Boneh and Franklin [BF03]. In the first place, we point out and fix a flaw in the security reduction given by the authors. In repairing the proof, we do not need to change the security assumption neither the specification of the scheme. However, the security reduction is a bit worse than the original one.

3.1 Boneh-Franklin IBE scheme

We will not directly use the original description of the BF scheme, because it is phrased with bilinear group pairs where $\mathbb{G}_1 = \mathbb{G}_2$, so we must adapt their scheme to the more general case $\mathbb{G}_1 \neq \mathbb{G}_2$. In choosing how to use \mathbb{G}_1 and \mathbb{G}_2 , we preferred to minimize the length of the ciphertexts. This means we use \mathbb{G}_2 as the set of private keys and then ciphertexts are elements in $\mathbb{G}_1^* \times \{0, 1\}^n$. Here follows the description of the BF scheme, which is called *Full-Ident* in [BF03].

Full-Ident

Setup. Let $(\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, G_T, \hat{e}, \psi)$ a bilinear group. Choose a generator $P_2 \leftarrow \mathbb{G}_2$ and set $P_1 = \psi(P_2)$. Next pick $s \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ and set $Q_{pub} = sP_2 \in \mathbb{G}_2^*$, $P_{pub} = sP_1 \in \mathbb{G}_1^*$. Choose cryptographic hash functions $H_1 : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_2^*$, $H_2 : \mathbb{G}_T \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$, $H_3 : \{0, 1\}^n \times \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^*$, $H_4 : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$. The message space is $\mathcal{M} = \{0, 1\}^n$ and the ciphertext space is $\mathcal{C} = \mathbb{G}_1^* \times \{0, 1\}^n \times \{0, 1\}^n$.
Extract. For a given string $ID \in \{0, 1\}^*$, compute $Q_{ID} = H_1(ID) \in \mathbb{G}_2^*$ and set the private key d_{ID} to be $d_{ID} = sQ_{ID} \in \mathbb{G}_2^*$.

Encrypt. To encrypt $M \in \{0, 1\}^n$ under identity ID , compute $Q_{ID} = H_1(ID) \in \mathbb{G}_2^*$, choose $\sigma \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^n$, set $r = H_3(\sigma, M) \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ and finally

$$C = \langle rP_1, \sigma \oplus H_2(g_{ID}^r), M \oplus H_4(\sigma) \rangle \quad \text{where} \quad g_{ID} = \hat{e}(P_{pub}, Q_{ID}) \in \mathbb{G}_T.$$

Decrypt. Let $C = \langle U, V, W \rangle \in \mathcal{C}$ be a ciphertext under the identity ID . To decrypt C using the private key $d_{ID} \in \mathbb{G}_2^*$ do:

1. Compute $V \oplus H_2(\hat{e}(U, d_{ID})) = \sigma$.
2. Compute $W \oplus H_4(\sigma) = M$.
3. Set $r = H_3(\sigma, M)$. Check that $U = rP$. If not, reject the ciphertext.
4. Output M .

This completes the description of Full-Ident. This IBE scheme is sound since

$$\hat{e}(U, d_{ID}) = \hat{e}(rP_1, sQ_{ID}) = \hat{e}(P_1, Q_{ID})^{sr} = \hat{e}(P_{pub}, Q_{ID})^r = g_{ID}^r.$$


In [BF03] it is proven that the above scheme is IND-ID-CCA secure under the BDH assumption in the Random Oracle model. That scheme uses Fujisaki and Okamoto transformation [FO99] from a one-way encryption scheme into an IND-CCA encryption scheme in the ROM (we refer to [BDPR98] for public key encryption security notions). If we denote by $E_{pk}(M, r)$ the encryption of M using the random bits r under the public key pk , the transformation by Fujisaki and Okamoto is the hybrid scheme¹

$$E_{pk}^{hy}(M) = \langle E_{pk}(\sigma, H_3(\sigma, M)), H_4(\sigma) \oplus M \rangle \quad (1)$$


where σ is random and H_3, H_4 are random oracles. To decrypt (C_1, C_2) , one first obtains σ' decrypting C_1 using the original scheme, next computes M' and finally checks if $E_{pk}(\sigma', H_3(\sigma', M)) = C_1$. If this is so, outputs M ; otherwise outputs reject.

Two additional schemes are needed in order to exhibit the security proof in [BF03]. These schemes are not IBE schemes but merely public key encryption schemes. They are called BasicPub and BasicPub^{hy}. Here follows the description of

¹ In the case where the symmetric encryption scheme is the one-time pad.



Finally, the scheme BasicPub^{hy} is the result of applying Fujisaki-Okamoto transformation (1) to the above scheme. The security reduction for Full-Ident scheme under the BDH assumption follows the diagram below



The following results are shown in [BF03]. Hereafter, q_E, q_D, q_{H_i} denote the number of extraction, decryption and random oracle H_i queries respectively.

Result 1 *Let \mathcal{A}_1 an IND-ID-CCA adversary that has advantage ε_2 against Full-Ident making at most q_E, q_D and q_{H_1} queries. Then there is an IND-CCA adversary \mathcal{A}_2 that has advantage at least $\frac{\varepsilon_2}{e(1+q_E+q_D)}$ against BasicPub^{hy} . Its running time is $t_2 \leq t_1 + c_{\mathbb{G}_2}(q_D + q_{H_1} + q_E)$, where $c_{\mathbb{G}_2}$ denotes the time of computing a random multiple in \mathbb{G}_2 .*

Result 2 *Let \mathcal{A}_2 an IND-CCA adversary that has advantage ε_2 against BasicPub^{hy} making at most q_D, q_{H_3} and q_{H_4} queries. Then there is an IND-CPA adversary \mathcal{A}_3 that has advantage at least $\frac{1}{2(q_{H_3}+q_{H_4})}[(\varepsilon_2 + 1)(1 - 2/p)^{q_D} - 1]$ against BasicPub. Its running time is $t_3 \leq t_2 + \mathcal{O}((q_{H_3} + q_{H_4}) \cdot (n + \log p))$.*

Result 3 *Let \mathcal{A}_3 an IND-CPA adversary that has advantage ε_3 against BasicPub making at most q_{H_2} queries. Then there is an algorithm \mathcal{B} breaking the BDH problem on $(\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2)$ with advantage at least $\frac{2\varepsilon_3}{q_{H_2}}$ and running time $t' \approx t_3$.*

In order to come up with the total concrete security, we can bound any q_{H_i} with a single q_H , and assume that $q_E = q_D$, since extraction and decryption operations have roughly the same computational complexity. Then, taking the above reductions, we obtain that the BF scheme is $(t_1, q_H, q_D, \varepsilon_1)$ IND-ID-CCA secure if the BDH problem on $(\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2)$ is

$$\left(t_1 + c_{\mathbb{G}_1}(2q_D + q_H) + 2q_H(n + \log p), \frac{\varepsilon_1}{8eq_H^2q_D} \right)\text{-secure.} \quad (2)$$

Therefore, the security reduction is far from tight, mainly because of the $q_H^2q_D$ factor relating the advantages against the scheme and the underlying problem.

3.2 A flaw in the security reduction

In this section we point out a flaw in the reduction used to state Result 1, which is Lemma 4.6 in [BF03].

The goal of that reduction is to construct an IND-CCA adversary \mathcal{B} with advantage $\varepsilon/e(1 + q_E + q_D)$ against BasicPub^{hy} by using an IND-ID-CCA adversary \mathcal{A} with advantage ε against Full-Ident . \mathcal{B} receives a public key

$$K_{pub} = \langle p, \mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, \mathbb{G}_T, \hat{e}, P_1, P_2, P_{pub}, Q, Q_{pub}, H_2, H_3, H_4 \rangle$$

from its challenger. Then \mathcal{B} simulates the challenger for \mathcal{A} as follows:

Setup \mathcal{B} gives \mathcal{A} the parameters $\langle p, \mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, \mathbb{G}_T, \hat{e}, P_1, P_2, P_{pub}, Q_{pub}, H_1, H_2, H_3, H_4 \rangle$, where H_1 is an oracle controlled by \mathcal{B} as indicated in the following:

H_1 -queries To respond to \mathcal{A} queries, algorithm \mathcal{B} maintains a list H_1^{list} of tuples $\langle \text{ID}_i, Q_i, b_i, c_i \rangle$ as explained below. When \mathcal{A} queries H_1 at an unrepeated ID_i , \mathcal{B} generates a random coin $c_i \in \{0, 1\}$ such that $\Pr[c_i = 0] = \delta$, and a random $b_i \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^*$. If $c_i = 0$ it computes $Q_i = b_i P_2 \in \mathbb{G}_2^*$, and if $c_i = 1$ it computes $Q_i = b_i Q \in \mathbb{G}_2^*$. Finally, \mathcal{B} adds the tuple $\langle \text{ID}_i, Q_i, b_i, c_i \rangle$ to the H_1^{list} and sends $H_1(\text{ID}_i) = Q_i$ to \mathcal{A} .

The idea is that tuples with $c_i = 0$ enable \mathcal{B} to answer private key queries for identity ID_i , while \mathcal{B} can only take profit of \mathcal{A} 's advantage when \mathcal{A} chooses a challenge identity ID_{ch} such that $c_{\text{ch}} = 1$.

Phase 1 - Extraction queries When \mathcal{A} asks for the private key associated to ID_i , \mathcal{B} runs the algorithm for responding H_1 -queries and gets $H_1(\text{ID}_i) = Q_i$, where $\langle \text{ID}_i, Q_i, b_i, c_i \rangle$ is the corresponding entry in H_1^{list} . If $c_i = 1$ then \mathcal{B} aborts the game and the attack against BasicPub^{hy} failed. Otherwise, $c_i = 0$ and therefore $Q_i = b_i P_2$. It turns out that d_i can be computed as $d_i := b_i Q_{pub}$, since by definition $d_i = sQ_i$. Finally, \mathcal{B} gives d_i to algorithm \mathcal{A} .

Phase 1 - Decryption queries \mathcal{B} answers to a decryption query $\langle \text{ID}_i, C_i \rangle$ as follows. It runs H_1 -queries algorithm and let $\langle \text{ID}_i, Q_i, b_i, c_i \rangle \in H_1^{\text{list}}$. If $c_i = 0$, then \mathcal{B} retrieves the private key d_i and decrypts C_i using the decryption algorithm. If $c_i = 1$, then $Q_i = b_i Q$. Recall that the unknown private key is $d_i = sQ_i = sb_i Q$. Set $C'_i = \langle b_i U_i, V_i, W_i \rangle$, where $C_i = \langle U_i, V_i, W_i \rangle$. Then, the

authors claim that the Full-Ident decryption of C_i is *equal* to the BasicPub^{hy} decryption of C'_i . The reason given is that

$$\widehat{e}(b_i U_i, d) = \widehat{e}(b_i U_i, sQ) = \widehat{e}(U_i, s b_i Q) = \widehat{e}(U_i, s Q_i) = \widehat{e}(U_i, d_i),$$

which implies that the values σ and M obtained by decrypting C_i with Full-Ident and by decrypting C'_i with BasicPub^{hy} are equal. However, BasicPub^{hy} will output the reject symbol when decrypting C'_i with overwhelming probability. To see this, remember that $b_i U_i = b_i r_i P_1$, and at least $b_i \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^*$, which implies that $b_i r$ is uniformly random in \mathbb{Z}_p^* . On the other hand, we have that H_3 is a random oracle not controlled by \mathcal{B} . These facts imply that $H_3(\sigma, M) \neq b_i r$ with probability $1 - 1/p$, and therefore the decryption algorithm of BasicPub^{hy} will reject the ciphertext. Thereby, we can not use the decryption oracle for BasicPub^{hy} to decrypt ciphertexts under any ID_i such that $H_1(ID_i) \neq Q$. Therefore, the reduction in [BF03] is not valid.

3.3 Fixing the security reduction

Due to the ciphertext integrity checking in FO transformation [FO99], we can only answer decryption queries $\langle ID_i, C_i \rangle$ such that:

- $H_1(ID_i) = b_i P_2$, since we can use the private key d_i , or
- $H_1(ID_i) = Q$, since in this case, the decryption of C_i under such ID_i is equal to the decryption of C_i by BasicPub^{hy}.

This remark enables us to fix the flawed reduction shown above. In the following we describe the new answers delivered by \mathcal{B} .

Setup As in Section 3.2.

H_1 -queries Before initializing H_1^{list} , \mathcal{B} selects at random $j \leftarrow \{1, \dots, q_{H_1}\}$. When \mathcal{A} queries H_1 at ID_i , algorithm \mathcal{B} proceeds as follows: if $i \neq j$, it picks $b_i \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^*$, sets $Q_i = b_i P_2$, adds $\langle ID_i, Q_i, b_i \rangle$ to the list and gives back Q_i to \mathcal{A} . If $i = j$, it sets $Q_j = Q$, adds $\langle ID_i, Q_i, * \rangle$ to the list and sends Q_j to \mathcal{A} . Here $*$ denotes a special symbol. Note that the outputs of H_1 are uniformly distributed in \mathbb{G}_2^* and independent of \mathcal{A} 's current view, since Q is unknown to \mathcal{A} and is uniformly distributed in \mathbb{G}_2^* .

Phase 1 - Extraction queries When \mathcal{A} asks for the private key for ID_i , \mathcal{B} runs the algorithm for responding H_1 -queries and gets $H_1(ID_i) = Q_i$, where $\langle ID_i, Q_i, b_i \rangle$ is the corresponding entry in H_1^{list} . If $i = j$, then \mathcal{B} aborts the game and the attack against BasicPub^{hy} failed. Otherwise, it sets $d_i := b_i Q_{pub}$. Finally, \mathcal{B} gives d_i to algorithm \mathcal{A} .

Phase 1 - Decryption queries \mathcal{B} answers to a decryption query $\langle ID_i, C_i \rangle$ as follows. It runs H_1 -queries algorithm and let $\langle ID_i, Q_i, b_i \rangle \in H_1^{\text{list}}$. If $i \neq j$, then \mathcal{B} retrieves the private key d_i and decrypts C_i using the decryption algorithm. If $i = j$, then $Q_i = Q$, and the decryption of $\langle ID_j, C_j \rangle$ is the same as the decryption of C_j under BasicPub^{hy}. Then, \mathcal{B} asks its challenger to decrypt C_j and relays the answer to \mathcal{A} .

Challenge \mathcal{A} outputs a public key ID_{ch} and two equal length plaintexts M_0, M_1 . Algorithm \mathcal{B} proceeds as follows. If $\text{ID}_{\text{ch}} \neq \text{ID}_j$, it aborts the game and the attack against $\text{BasicPub}^{\text{hy}}$ failed. Otherwise, it sends M_0, M_1 to its own challenger and gets back C , the encryption of M_β for a random bit β under $\text{BasicPub}^{\text{hy}}$. Finally, \mathcal{B} relays C to \mathcal{A} , which is an also encryption of M_β under ID_{ch} for Full-Ident.

Phase 2 - Extraction queries Algorithm \mathcal{B} proceeds as in Phase 1, except for the extraction query for ID_{ch} , which is rejected.

Phase 2 - Decryption queries Algorithm \mathcal{B} proceeds as in Phase 1, except for the decryption query $\langle \text{ID}_{\text{ch}}, C_\beta \rangle$, which is rejected.

Guess Algorithm \mathcal{A} outputs a guess β' for β . \mathcal{B} outputs β' as its guess.

Using this algorithm \mathcal{B} , we are able to state the following:

Result 4 *Let \mathcal{A} an IND-ID-CCA adversary that has advantage ε against Full-Ident making at most q_E, q_D and q_{H_1} queries. Then there is an IND-CCA adversary \mathcal{B} that has advantage at least $\frac{\varepsilon}{q_{H_1}} \left(1 - \frac{q_E}{q_{H_1}}\right) \approx \frac{\varepsilon}{q_{H_1}}$ against $\text{BasicPub}^{\text{hy}}$. Its running time is $t_2 \leq t_1 + c_{\mathbb{G}_2}(q_D + q_{H_1} + q_E)$, where $c_{\mathbb{G}_2}$ denotes the time of computing a random multiple in \mathbb{G}_2 .*

Proof: See Appendix A. □

Therefore, joining Results 2, 3 and 4, an IND-ID-CCA advantage ε_1 against Full-Ident is turned into an algorithm with advantage roughly $\varepsilon_1/(q_H^3)$ in solving the BDH problem. Compared to the original flawed reduction, where the advantage obtained against BDH was roughly $\varepsilon_1/(q_H^2 q_D)$, the new reduction is a bit worse, since in general $q_D \ll q_H$. In the next section we show a modification of Full-Ident which allows a tighter security reduction.

4 A new identity based encryption scheme with improved tightness

In this section we design a new IBE scheme using the scheme Basic-Ident from the previous section and a second general transformation also due to Fujisaki and Okamoto [FO00]. This conversion starts from an IND-CPA encryption scheme and builds an IND-CCA scheme in the ROM. If we denote by $E_{\text{pk}}(M, r)$ the encryption of M using the random bits r under the public key pk , with set of messages $\mathcal{M} = \{0, 1\}^n$, set of coins \mathcal{R} and set of ciphertexts \mathcal{C} , the new transformation is the scheme

$$E_{\text{pk}}^{\text{hyNew}}(M) = E_{\text{pk}}(M||r, H(M||r)) \quad (3)$$

where $M||r \in \{0, 1\}^{n-k_0} \times \{0, 1\}^{k_0}$ and $H : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \mathcal{R}$ is a hash function. Then, $\mathcal{M}^{\text{hyNew}} = \{0, 1\}^{n-k_0}$, $\mathcal{R}^{\text{hyNew}} = \{0, 1\}^{k_0}$ and $\mathcal{C}^{\text{hyNew}} = \mathcal{C}$. To decrypt C , one first obtains $M'||r'$ using the original decryption algorithm, and next checks if $E_{\text{pk}}(M'||r', H(M'||r')) = C$. If this is so, outputs M ; otherwise outputs

reject.

Let us describe the new IBE scheme thereby obtained.

NewFull-Ident

Setup. Let $(\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, G_T, \hat{e}, \psi)$ a bilinear group. Choose a generator $P_2 \leftarrow \mathbb{G}_2$ and set $P_1 = \psi(P_2)$. Next pick $s \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ and set $Q_{pub} = sP_2 \in \mathbb{G}_2^*, P_{pub} = sP_1 \in \mathbb{G}_1^*$. Choose hash functions $H_1 : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_2^*, H_2 : \mathbb{G}_T \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$ and $H_3 : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^*$. Now $\mathcal{M} = \{0, 1\}^{n-k_0}, \mathcal{C} = \mathbb{G}_1^* \times \{0, 1\}^n$ and $\text{params} = \langle p, \mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, \mathbb{G}_T, \hat{e}, P_1, P_2, P_{pub}, Q_{pub}, H_1, H_2, H_3 \rangle$. The master-key is $s \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$.

Extract. For a given ID $\in \{0, 1\}^*$, compute $Q_{ID} = H_1(\text{ID}) \in \mathbb{G}_2^*$ and set $d_{ID} = sQ_{ID} \in \mathbb{G}_2^*$ where s is the master key.

Encrypt. To encrypt $M \in \{0, 1\}^{n-k_0}$ under ID, compute $Q_{ID} = H_1(\text{ID}) \in \mathbb{G}_2^*$, choose $\sigma \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{k_0}$, set $r = H_3(M, \sigma) \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ and finally

$$C = \langle rP_1, (M||\sigma) \oplus H_2(g_{ID}^r) \rangle \quad \text{where} \quad g_{ID} = \hat{e}(P_{pub}, Q_{ID}) \in \mathbb{G}_T$$

Decrypt. Let $C = \langle U, V \rangle \in \mathcal{C}$ be a ciphertext under the public key ID. To decrypt C using the private key $d_{ID} \in \mathbb{G}_2^*$ do:

1. Compute $V \oplus H_2(\hat{e}(U, d_{ID})) = M||\sigma$.
2. Parse $M||\sigma$ and compute $r = H_3(M, \sigma)$. Check that $U = rP$. If not, reject the ciphertext.
4. Output M .

On the basis of the proof sketched in the previous section, we define in a similar fashion a public key encryption scheme **NewBasicPub**^{hy}, which is obtained applying the conversion from expression (3) to **Basic-Pub**. Then the following results hold:

Result 5 *Let \mathcal{A}_1 an IND-ID-CCA adversary with advantage ε_1 against NewFull-Ident making at most q_E private key extraction queries, q_D decryption queries and q_{H_1} hash queries. Then there is an IND-CCA adversary \mathcal{A}_2 that has advantage at least $\frac{\varepsilon}{q_{H_1}} \left(1 - \frac{q_E}{q_{H_1}}\right) \approx \frac{\varepsilon}{q_{H_1}}$ against NewBasicPub^{Hy}. Its running time is $t_2 \leq t_1 + c_{\mathbb{G}_1}(q_D + q_{H_1} + q_E)$.*

Proof: Use the same reduction as for Result 4 in Section 3.3.

Result 6 *Let \mathcal{A}_2 an IND-CCA adversary with advantage ε_2 against NewBasicPub^{hy} making at most q_D decryption queries and at most q_{H_2} hash queries. Then there is an IND-CPA adversary \mathcal{A}_3 that has advantage at least*

$$\left(\varepsilon_2 - q_{H_2} \cdot 2^{-(k_0-1)}\right) \left(1 - \frac{1}{p}\right)^{q_D} \approx \varepsilon_2$$

*against BasicPub. Its running time is $t_3 \leq t_2 + q_{H_2}(T_{\text{BasicPub}} + \log p)$, where T_{BasicPub} is the running time of **Encrypt** algorithm in BasicPub.*

Proof: This result is obtained as a special case of Theorem 5.4 in [FO00].

Finally, taking into account these new reductions, we obtain that **NewFull-Ident** scheme is $(t_1, q_H, q_D, \varepsilon_1)$ IND-ID-CCA secure if the BDH problem on $(\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2)$ is

$$\left(t_1 + c_{\mathbb{G}_1}(2q_D + q_H) + q_H \mathcal{O}(\log^3 p + \log p), \frac{\varepsilon_1}{q_H} \right)\text{-secure}$$

The last expression has been simplified replacing any of the hash queries q_{H_i} by q_H and setting $q_D = q_E$. Then, we get rid of a q_H factor in the BDH advantage with respect to the reduction in expression (2).

Compared to **Full-Ident** scheme, which is the result of using FO transformation in expression (1), the **NewFull-Ident** scheme presents several advantages:

- It provides more compact ciphertexts. In fact, **Full-Ident** scheme adds a n -bits component to a **Basic-Ident** ciphertext to get chosen ciphertext security, while **NewFull-Ident** achieves this preserving **Basic-Ident** ciphertext's structure.
- It presents a tighter security reduction to the BDH problem.
- It uses one less hash function than **Full-Ident**.

We can obtain a second tightness improvement using a stronger assumption, namely, the BDDH assumption. In this case, we have the following result:

Result 7 *Let \mathcal{A}_3 an IND-CPA adversary that has advantage ε_3 against **BasicPub** making at most q_{H_2} hash queries. Then there is an algorithm \mathcal{B} breaking the BDDH problem on $(\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2)$ with advantage roughly ε_3 and running time $t' \approx t_3$.*

Proof: See Appendix B. □

With this second tightness improvement, we obtain that **NewFull-Ident** scheme is $(t_1, q_H, q_D, \varepsilon_1)$ IND-ID-CCA secure if the BDDH problem on $(\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2)$ is

$$\left(t_1 + c_{\mathbb{G}_1}(2q_D + q_H) + q_H \mathcal{O}(\log^3 q + \log q), \frac{\varepsilon_1}{q_H} \right)\text{-secure}$$

Then, we get rid of a q_H factor in the security reduction at the cost of relying on a stronger assumption.

5 Conclusions

In this work, we have shown there is a flawed step in the security reduction exhibited in [BF03] for the so called Boneh-Franklin IBE scheme. We have provided a new reduction without modifying the original scheme neither the underlying hard problem used to state the security.

In the second place, we have proposed a new IBE scheme slightly changing the original scheme. The proposal presents a tighter reduction than BF scheme, uses one less random oracle and has more compact ciphertexts.

Finally, we point out that it is still an open problem to design an IND-ID-CCA IBE scheme with a tight security reduction under a reasonable assumption either in the standard or the random oracle models.

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A Proof of Result 4

If algorithm \mathcal{B} does not abort during the simulation, \mathcal{A} 's view is identical to its view in a real attack: H_1 behaves as random oracle, and extraction as well as

decryption queries are valid. Therefore, $|\Pr[\beta' = \beta] - 1/2| \geq \varepsilon$, where this probability is over the random bits of \mathcal{A}, \mathcal{B} and the challenger for the IND-ID-CCA game.

It remains to bound the probability $\Pr[\mathcal{B} \text{ does not abort}]$. The algorithm can abort for two reasons: (1) it is asked in Phase 1 for the private key query corresponding to ID_j , or (2) the challenge identity $\text{ID}_{\text{ch}} \neq \text{ID}_j$. Note that \mathcal{B} can not abort in Phase 2, since in this case \mathcal{A} is not allowed to query the private key for $\text{ID}_j = \text{ID}_{\text{ch}}$. Let \mathcal{E}_1 be the event that \mathcal{B} aborts due to (1), and define \mathcal{E}_2 in the obvious way.

Then, $\Pr[\mathcal{B} \text{ does not abort}] = \Pr[\neg\mathcal{E}_1 \wedge \neg\mathcal{E}_2] = \Pr[\neg\mathcal{E}_2 | \neg\mathcal{E}_1] \Pr[\neg\mathcal{E}_1]$.

We can upper bound for $\Pr[\mathcal{E}_1] \leq q_E/q_H$, which is the probability that \mathcal{A} makes an extraction query for ID_j in Phase 1, since the maximum number of such queries is q_E .

On the other hand, a lower bound for $\Pr[\neg\mathcal{E}_2 | \neg\mathcal{E}_1]$, that is the probability that \mathcal{A} chooses ID_j as the challenge identity, is $1/q_{H_1}$. Therefore,

$$\Pr[\mathcal{B} \text{ does not abort}] \geq \frac{1}{q_{H_1}} \left(1 - \frac{q_E}{q_{H_1}}\right).$$

This shows that \mathcal{B}' 's advantage is at least

$$\frac{\varepsilon}{q_{H_1}} \left(1 - \frac{q_E}{q_{H_1}}\right).$$

□

B Proof of Result 7

Algorithm \mathcal{B} receives as inputs the bilinear group $(\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2)$, and a random instance $(P_2, aP_2, bP_2, cP_1, T)$ from either \mathcal{P}_{BDH} or \mathcal{R}_{BDH} distributions. Then \mathcal{B} uses \mathcal{A} IND-CPA advantage against BasicPub to distinguish \mathcal{P}_{BDH} from \mathcal{R}_{BDH} .

Setup \mathcal{B} provides \mathcal{A} with the public key $\text{pk} = \langle p, \mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, \mathbb{G}_T, \hat{e}, P_1, P_2, P_{\text{pub}}, Q_{\text{pub}}, Q, H_2 \rangle$, where $P_1 = \psi(P_2)$, $Q_{\text{pub}} = aP_2$, $P_{\text{pub}} = \psi(Q_{\text{pub}})$, $Q = bP_2$ and H_2 is a random oracle controlled by \mathcal{B} as explained below. Notice that the unknown private key of BasicPub is $d = abP_2$.

H_2 -queries To respond \mathcal{A} queries to H_2 , \mathcal{B} maintains a list H_2^{list} of tuples $\langle X_i, H_i \rangle$. When queried with X_i , algorithm \mathcal{B} does the following:

1. If $\langle X_i, H_i \rangle \in H_2^{\text{list}}$, it returns $H_2(X_i) = H_i$.
2. Otherwise, \mathcal{B} picks $H_i \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^n$, adds the tuple $\langle X_i, H_i \rangle$ to the list and returns $H_2(X_i) = H_i$.

Challenge \mathcal{A} outputs two equal length plaintexts M_0, M_1 in which it wishes to be challenged. Algorithm \mathcal{B} returns as the challenge ciphertext $C = \langle cP_1, M_\beta \oplus H_2(T) \rangle$, where $\beta \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$.

Guess \mathcal{A} eventually outputs a guess β' for β . Algorithm \mathcal{B} returns 1 if $\beta' = \beta$ and 0 otherwise.

Algorithm \mathcal{B} is simulating a real attack environment for \mathcal{A} . If the random instance is from \mathcal{R}_{BDH} , then $\Pr[\beta' = \beta] = 1/2$, since in this case the distribution of the ciphertext C is independent of the bit β . Otherwise, the instance comes from \mathcal{P}_{BDH} , C is a valid encryption of M_β and therefore $\Pr[\beta' = \beta] = 1/2 + \varepsilon$ by definition of \mathcal{A} . Therefore,

$$|\Pr[\mathcal{B}(\mathcal{P}_{BDH}) = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{B}(\mathcal{R}_{BDH}) = 1]| = |1/2 + \varepsilon - 1/2| = \varepsilon.$$

□